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boats for purely recreational purposes is insufficient to demonstrate that the pond has a
capacity or suitability for commercial transportation." Jd. at 84.
The court held that Mohawk Club failed to present a prima facie case because it
was unable to demonstrate that Lake Mariaville had any historic use of commercial
transportation and the lake lacked suitable public access. The Appellate Division, Third
Department affirmed the lower court's denial of plaintiffs motion.
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APPLICATION O F TH E CARMACK AMENDMEN T, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14706, TO
LAND CARRIERS
A shipper establishes aprimafacie case when it shows: (1) delivery in good
condition, (2) arrival in damaged condition, and (3 ) the amount of damages. Upon
such a showing, the burden shifts to the carrier to show both that it was free from
negligence and that the damages to the cargo were due to one of the excepted causes
relieving the carrier of liability: (1) acts of God, (2) acts of the public enemy, (3 ) acts
of the shipper himself, (4) public authority, or (5) the inherent vice or nature of the
goods. Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C.S § 14706.
Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co. v. Yellow Freight Systems, lnc.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
325 F. 3d 924
(Decided April 10, 2003)
Plaintiff, American National Fire Insurance Company (" American National"),
subrogee of a cigar manufacturer alleged that a shipment of cigars transported by the
defendant, Yellow Freight Systems ("Yellow Freight"), was damaged in transit due to
water leakage in the freight carrier's trailer. Plaintiff brought suit in United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, claiming damages
under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14706. The district court ruled that the
plaintiff-subrogee had established a prima facie case under the Carn1ack Amendment. In
addition the district court held that the defendant failed to prove that it was free from
negligence and that the damage to the cargo was due to one of the excepted causes
relieving it from liability. The district court awarded the plaintiff the costs of freight,
taxes, and insurance.
The defendant appeals the district court's nding that the plaintiff proved a prima
facie case under the Carmack Amendment, that the defendant did not prove any of the
excepted causes, and that the damaged cartons were part of the shipment at issue. In
addition, the defendant appeals the district court's award of freight, taxes, and insurance.
The plaintiff cross-appeals the district court's decision that the elate of subrogation, rather
than the elate of delivery of the damaged goods, should be used to determine the date of
accrual for prejudgment interest. In addition, the plaintiff argues that the district court
erred in awarding simple rather than compound interest. The United States Court of
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Appeals for the Seventh Circuit partially affirmed the district court's ruling, but reduced
the award to reflect a determination that only a percentage of the cargo was damaged.
The issue of whether to award prejudgment interest rather than compound interest was
remanded back to the district court for further examination.
In making this determination, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court was
correct in determining that the plaintiff proved that the cargo was in good condition upon
delivery to the defendant and was damaged upon arrival to its destination, therefore
establishing a prima facie case against the defendant. In addition, the court determined
that the defendant failed to prove it was free from negligence and that the damage to the
cargo was due to one of the excepted causes relieving it from l iability. Testimony of the
defendant's freight's driver stated that upon delivery to the defendant, some of the
cardboard box tops were "crunched," but there was no indication that the cartons were
wet or sufficiently damaged. Yet at the time of arrival, testimony showed that the cartons
were wet, some of the bottoms were disintegrated, and many boxes were crushed. The
court affirmed the district court's ruling that the defendants failed to prove that the
damage was caused by the shipper's improper packaging. The defendant argued that the
damage was caused by the plaintiffs use of cardboard boxes rather than crates in
packaging. The court affirmed the lower court's finding that the shipper had received
millions of cigars packed in used cardboard boxes that arrived undamaged.
With regards to the defendant's complaint that a comparison of the inventory of
the plaintiffs adjuster, the original packing lists shows that 45 of 59 damaged cartons
were not a part of the 118 cartons at issue. The defendant claims that the original packing
list noted two types of cigars and two lengths, while the plaintiffs adjuster showed
multiple types and lengths of cigars. The Seventh Circuit concluded that, despite the
argued discrepancies, the defendant neglected to submit evidence to prove this allegation.
However, with respect to the defendant's argument that the district court erred in
award i ng the plaintiff recovery for taxes, fees, freight charges, and insurance for the
entire shipment, the court noted that under the Carmack Amendment shippers can
"recover for actual losses to their property caused by the carrier." Under Carmack, the
ordinary measure of damages is the difference between the market value of the property
had it arrived undamaged and the market value in the condition in which it did arrive.
Under this measurement, the shipper i s not entitled to recover freight costs because that
cost is figured into the market price. The lower court did not follow the ordinary market
cost measurement of damages and instead awarded plaintiff damages based on the cost to
the shipper of the cigars damaged. The lower court also awarded plaintiff taxes, broker's
fees, freight and insurance paid for the entire cigar shipment. The Seventh Circuit
reversed holding that plaintiff should be awarded freight, taxes, insurance, and fees for
only fifty-five percent of the shipment was not destroyed. If awarded the cost for the
undamaged cigars, the court stated that the plaintiff would be recovering twice.
The court affirmed the district court's award of prejudgment interest accruing
from the date that the plaintiff-subrogee paid the shipper. In affirming the district court's
opinion, the Court noted that the plaintiff was only entitled to recover the money it had
actually paid to the shipper; which was the interest from the point it actually paid the
shipper, not from the date that the carrier delivered the damaged cargo to its destination.
Finally, the court questioned the district court's decision to change its award from
compound to simple interest. While the court did not specifically condemn this decision,

7

it remanded the issue back to the district court for an explanation of the lower court' s
rationale.
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TH E PROPRIETY OF AN ADMIN IS TRATIVE LAW JUDGE CON S IDERING
A N INDIVIDUAL'S MOTION FOR MODIFICATION O F A D ISABILITY
CLAIM
A claim of mistake in a motion to modify disability benefits based on medical
reports created after the initial decision is a factual, rather than legal issue. Thus it
is proper for an Administrative L aw J udge to consider the motion.
Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Campbell
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
59 Fed. Appx. 568
(Decided March II, 2003)
In I987, appellee Terry Campbell injured his head, neck, and back while working
for appellant Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Corporation ("Norshipco"). After the
incident, Campbell continued to work for Norshipco from May I987 to January I993
receiving differing amounts of disability compensation. In response, Campbell filed a
claim for temporary total disability under the Longshore and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act ("LHWCA"). After reviewing Campbell's claim, the Administrative
Law Judge ("ALJ") concluded that: (I) Campbell was not fired in retaliation for filing a
disability claim, (2) suitable alternate employment existed despite Campbell's limitations,
and (3) Campbell was fired from the suitable alternate employment for willful
misconduct. Accordingly, the ALJ rejected Campbell's claim for temporary total
disability.
Campbell filed a request for modification pursuant to Section 22 of the LHWCA,
which allows a compensation decision to be modified based on a change of condition or a
mistake of fact. Campbell alleged a change in condition and a mistake of fact with regard
to his ability to perform the light duty employment offered by Norshipco. After a second
hearing, the ALJ concluded that there had been no change in condition nor had there been
a mistake of fact. Campbell appealed this decision to the Department of Labor's Benefits
Review Board ("BRB"). The BRB affirmed the AU's decision that there had been no
change in condition, but remanded for further consideration on the issue of whether there
had been a mistake of fact regarding the alternate employment offered to Campbell. On
remand, the ALJ concluded that the alternate work offered by Norshipco was outside
Campbell's abilities and awarded him permanent partial disability benefits. After
subsequent appeals by Norshipco to the BRB, the ALJ issued a final order awarding
limited benefits to Campbell. After the BRB affirmed this decision, Norshipco appealed
to the Fourth Circuit.
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